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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
INTERMDUNTAIN HOLDING COMPANY, 
Plaint i ff/Respondent, 
vs. 
ADVANCE BUSINESS EQUIPMENT, 
Defendant/Appel lant. 
Civil No. 870063 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Whether the Trial Court's decision to deny Defendant's 
Motion To Set Aside Judgment was an abuse of discretion, 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In this proceeding, Appellant, a Utah Corporation, filed a 
Motion pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure to set aside a Judgment which had been rendered against 
it. Following a hearing and the submission of Affidavits and 
other testimony, Judge Scott Daniels denied the Defendant's 
Motion. This appeal is filed specifically to reverse that 
ruling. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant requests this Court reverse the decision of the 
Trial Court and set aside the Judgment. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On or about the 3rd day of February, 1975, Plaintiff and 
Defendant entered into a written Lease Agreement to lease 
business premises from which the Defendant would operate its 
business located at 2281 South West Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
The Lease Agreement expired after three (3) years. 
On January 31, 1978, the Defendant continued to occupy the 
premises on a month-to-month tenancy. The parties entered into 
negotiations on a new Lease Agreement while the Defendant was 
still occupying the premises, but these negotiations did not come 
to fruition. 
That on or about October 13, 1978, the Defendant was served 
with a Fifteen (15) Day Notice To Quit, pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 78-36-3-2, (1953). 
After the Fifteen (15) Day Notice To Quit was served, but 
before the initiation of the lawsuit, the Defendant signed the 
new renewal Lease, but the Plaintiff proceeded and filed the 
lawsuit which is the subject of this Appeal on November 2, 1978. 
(See Record on Appeal, Complaint and attached documents, Civil 
No. C-78-6868) 
Subsequent to the filing of the lawsuit the parties entered 
into negotiations concerning a resolution of the suit and a 
Stipulation was entered (See Record on Appeal, Stipulation for 
Settlement, Civil No. c-78-6868), for which the Defendant agreed 
to pay the sum of $2,899.42 within seven (7) days, crediting the 
Defendant with the receipt of $1,800.00 already in hand and that 
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the Defendant would remove itself on or before February 28, 1979. 
The provision was also included that if the Defendant failed 
to make the payment or vacate, that no confession of Judgment 
would be entered, but that the Plaintiff would proceed on the 
Complaint and the Defendant would file an Answer. Thereafter, 
nothing further happened on the case for a period of one and 
one-half years, when, on August 12, 1980, the Plaintiff caused to 
be filed a Default Certificate on the basis of an Affidavit 
signed by counsel, Steven Stoker, that in fact, the provisions of 
the Settlement Stipulation had not been met and counsel for the 
Defendant and Defendant had been notified. (See Record on 
Appeal, Affidavit of Steven Stoker, Civil No. C-78-6868) 
That the Record is devoid of any Notice of Default being 
sent to either counsel for Defendant or Defendant itself, but 
nonetheless, a Default Certificate was entered some eighteen (18) 
months after the Settlement Stipulation. 
Immediately thereafter, Defendant filed a timely Motion to 
Set Aside Judgment under Rule 60(b). The Motion was stricken 
from the docket after counsel had had discussions with new 
counsel for Plaintiff and believed that the Judgment would be 
removed because it was in error. (See Record on Appeal, 
Affidavit of John T. Caine, in most recent hearing to set aside) 
Thereafter, no further action was taken by the Plaintiff to 
attempt to collect Judgment or to in any way advise the Defendant 
that they still considered the Judgment valid and they intended 
for it to be paid. 
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In March of 1985, Defendant received notice from Attorney 
Mark Larsen, who had also been representing others in adversary 
actions against the Defendant, that he had acquired the 
Plaintiff's Judgment and was attempting to foreclose on a piece 
of Defendant's property. That this action caused the Defendant 
to file for bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court, 
Central Division, District of Utah and subsequent thereto, as 
part of Defendant's Plan in the bankruptcy, a new Motion to Set 
Aside the Judgment was filed. It was heard before the Honorable 
Scott Daniels on December 19, 1986. At that time, the Defendant 
presented testimony and Affidavit from Attorney John T. Caine and 
other documentary evidence showing that the amount in fact had 
been paid. 
The Court after hearing the evidence and testimony, 
determined however that the Motion should be denied and it is 
from that decision that this Appeal is taken. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGIMENT 
The Trial Court erred in refusing to set aside the Judgment 
pursuant to Rule 60(b) given the nature of the history of the 
case, together with undisputed factual allegations made by the 
Defendant and such denial was an abuse of its discretion. 
ARGLMENT 
The Utah Supreme Court has taken the firm position that the 
Trial Court has rather broad discretion in determining whether or 
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not a Rule 60 Motion will be granted and they will reverse the 
Trial Court's ruling only if there has been abuse of discretion. 
(See Larsen v. Collina, 684 P.2d. 52, (Utah 1984) 
In this case, Defendant believes however, that the sequence 
of events surrounding this particular action and the basic 
injustice resulting from those events compelled the Trial Court 
to grant the Motion and should compel this Court to reverse the 
Trial Court's decision. 
Rule 60(b) is comprised of seven (7) subsections or reasons 
which a Court may consider are grounds for granting relief frcxn a 
Judgment. There is no question that initially, the Defendant 
filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment within the three (3) month 
time frame, following the entry of the Judgment on August 12, 
1980 on the basis of reason number one (1) of 60(b), "mistake, 
inadvertent, surprise or excusable neglect", and the matter was 
set for hearing. 
Defendant believes that there is no question that under the 
factual circumstances, to-wit: that Defendant in fact had paid 
the required amount, and in addition, the Plaintiff had waited 
eighteen (18) months before filing a Notice of Default and in 
fact, had not notified anyone of the Default in the Agreement and 
allowed the Defendant to file an Answer, that Defendant had a 
meritorious defense and could have prevailed at the hearing. 
The case then becomes somewhat cloudy, but the only evidence 
before Judge Daniels was that the Motion To Set Aside was 
stricken on the basis that counsel had talked about the matter 
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and Plaintiff had agreed that the Judgment had been taken in 
error. Then, no further action was taken by Plaintiff on the 
Judgment to give Defendant any indication that Plaintiff still 
considered the Judgment valid. 
Judge Daniels, at the 1986 hearing, therefore, had before 
him a Rule 60(b) Motion under subsection seven, that being "any 
other reason justifying relief from the operation of the 
Judgment". This has long been viewed as an equitable-interest of 
justice consideration, wherein if the Court believes that for 
whatever reason, in the interest of fairness, that the Judgment 
should be removed then the Court should take that action. 
In this case, the information before the Court, was 
unrefuted by Affidavit or any other document, that in fact, 
Defendant had relied on what it believed was a recognition by the 
Plaintiff after the initial filing for relief from Judgment, that 
the Judgment was improper and no action would be taken. That 
five (5) years elapsed before any other action was taken and 
clearly, from the evidence presented to the Court, the Defendant 
owed no money to the Plaintiff under the original Stipulation. 
Defendant recognizes that in reviewing a Motion to Set Aside 
Judgment, the Court must not only determine that there is an 
applicable section of Rule 60(b) to the case, but also find that 
the Motion was timely and there is a meritorious defense. (See 
State ExRel Utah State Department of Social Services v. 
Mussel lman, 667 P.2d. 1053, (Utah 1983) Therefore, the focus of 
the reviewing Court in this case, should be on whether the Court 
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abused its discretion in reviewing the case for timeliness and 
meritorious defense. 
Certainly timeliness here is in question, because of the six 
(6) year period from the entry of the Judgment to the new Motion. 
What is interesting though, is this is not a situation where the 
Plaintiff has clean hands. The Plaintiff in fact, initially 
filed a Default Certificate eighteen (18) months after an 
Agreement was allegedly breached, without notice to any other 
party. Additionally, Plaintiff took no action after a Motion To 
Set Aside was filed for five (5) years to attempt to execute on 
any Judgment. 
Therefore, Defendant's actions were taken only after it 
reasonably appeared to Defendant, that the matter had been 
resolved and Plaintiff's own actions supported that view. In 
essence, Defendant's delay was occasioned by the action, or for 
that matter, the non-action of the Plaintiff. Plaintiff cannot 
now claim timeliness in its benefit. 
As to the merits of the defense, clearly Defendant has a 
defense that in fact it had complied with the terms of the 
Settlement Agreement and that Plaintiff had no right to enforce 
the default provisions against him. At the hearing before Judge 
Daniels, Defendant presented evidence showing in fact, payments 
made pursuant to the Stipulation, which vitiated the default 
provision. 
Therefore, under the current standards utilized by the Utah 
Supreme Court, Defendant met the burden required by Rule 60(b) 
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for setting aside a Judgment. Even allowing for the Trial 
Court's broad discretion, there is no factor in this case which 
argues favorably for the sustaining of a Judgment which is 
clearly based upon an erroneous set of circumstances. 
This Court's attention, in its capacity as a reviewing body, 
is directed to the entire record of these proceedings and 
Defendant strongly believes that after a thorough review, that 
the Court will find that the Trial Court abused its discretion 
and that Defendant's Motion should have been granted and relief 
from Judgment occasioned therefrom. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant urges this Court to reverse the decision of 
the Trial Court and hold that pursuant to Rule 60(b)(7), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, that in the interest of justice and 
equity, the Judgment should be set aside and either conduct a 
further evidentiary hearing on whether or not any amount is due 
and owing the Plaintiff, or allow the case to proceed after a 
full hearing on the merits. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of July, 1987. 
JOHN T. CAINE 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
Thereby certify that I mailed four true and correct copies 
of the above and foregoing Brief of Appellant to counsel for the 
PIaintiff/Respondent, Mark A. Larsen, Attorney at Law, 310 South 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
INTERMOUNTAIN HOLDING COMPANY, 
a partnership, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ADVANCE BUSINESS EQUIPMENT, 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT 
Civil No. C-78-6868 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
County of Salt Lake ) 
STEPHEN G. STOKER, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes 
and states: 
1. He is an attorney working with the law firm of Fox, 
Edwards & Gardiner, plaintiff's legal counsel herein, and as such 
has knowledge of the following. 
2. On or about the 10th day of February, 1979 the parties 
hereto, by and through their counsel, entered into a Stipulation 
for Settlement wherein the defendant Advance Business Equipment 
agreed to pay to the plaintiff the sum of §2,899.42 within seven 
"(7) days of February 10, 1979. 
3. Pursuant to said Stipulation, the plaintiff received 
only $1,800.00. 
4. The defendant breached said Stipulation for Settlement 
in that It failed to pay the remaining amounts due and owing 
under the settlement agreement and failed to remove itself from 
the rental premises on or before February 28, 1979. 
5. Said Stipulation for Settlement is on file herein and 
Paragraph 4 thereof provides that should the defendant fail to 
make payments or vacate the premises as set forth therein, the 
plaintiff may proceed on its Complaint and that the defendant 
will answer. 
6. On or about June 14, 1979 affiant notified John T. 
Caine, attorney for defendant, of the breaches of the Stipulation 
for Settlement and notified Mr. Caine of plaintiff's intention to 
enter the default of Advance Business Equipment. Despite such 
notice, affiant has received no response from the defendant or 
its attorney and knows of no response to any other persons. 
7. Affiant has read the foregoing and knows the contents 
thereof to be true and correct of his own personal knowledge. 
STEPHEN ,6/ STOKER 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this \V• day 
of "Xi • • , 1980. 
• 'V^: <N^ 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
My commission expires: 
AFFIDAVIT OF STEPHEN G. STOKER - 2 
FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Gait Lake County. Utah 
' i l i; I 2 1980 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
W Ster\rfo Evaf«.Cicrkftd pis!. Court 
ffl/UL: 
Randall S. Peil 
FOX, EDWARDS & GARDINER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2000 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 521-7751 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
INTERMOUNTAIN HOLDING COMPANY, 
a partnership, 
Plaintiff, 
vs, 
ADVANCE BUSINESS EQUIPMENT, 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT 
Civil No. C-78-6868 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss. 
County of Salt Lake ) 
RAY BOWERS, being first duly sworn uoon oath, deposes and 
states: 
1. He is a partner in Intermountain Holding Company, the 
plaintiff herein, and has had personal dealings and transactions 
with respect to the matter sued upon herein/ and has personal 
knowledge of the following. 
2. He has read the Complaint filed in this matter by 
Intermountain Holding Company, a partnership, and knows the 
contents thereof to be true and correct of his own personal 
Knowledge. 
3. Advance Business Equipment Corporation, the defendant, 
having been served on October 13, 1978 with a fifteen-day Notice 
to Quit, unlawfully detained the premises described in the Complaint 
until the / 3 » day of FlLX-H, , ly79f and thus the 
defendant unlawfully detained the described premises for a period 
of Tff days. 
4. The reasonable rental value of the premises during the 
period it was unlawfully detained by the defendant was $15.00 per 
day and treble the reasonable rental value of the premises was 
$45.00 per day. 
5. Intermountain Holding Company, the plaintiff, has 
received from the defendant the sum of $1,800.00 which should be 
credited to the amounts due and owing to Intermountain Holding 
Company for the unlawful detainer of the premises. 
6. Affiant has read the foregoing and knows the contents 
thereof to be true and correct of his own personal knowledge. 
RAY/BOWERS 
, *4 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this //' day 
J uL of  UU\ , 1 9 8 0 . 
Ml ^ <y 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Res id ing a t ScUUiU C'K Ut. 
<$-
My commission expires: 
i2~ 2*- V? 
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REED M. RICHARDS of 
RICHARDS, CAINE & RICHARDS 
Attorney for ^ Defendant 
2568 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: 399J-4191 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
INTERMDUNTAIN HOLDING COMPANY, : 
a partnership, : AFFIDAVIT OF ATTORNEY 
JOHN T. CAINE 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : 
ADVANCE BUSINESS EQUIPMENT, : Civil No. C-78-6868 
Defendant. : 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
OOUNTY OF WEBER j 
GOMES NCW, JOHN T. CAINE and being first duly sworn upon his 
oath, deposes and states: 
1. That I was the Attorney for Defendant above named in 
1979. 
2. That the Defendant rented space from the Plaintiff until 
the Spring of 1980. 
3. That the Plaintiff initiated a lawsuit against the 
Defendant, which was resolved by a stipulation by the parties 
which would allow Defendant to remain on the premises until a 
certain date and pay a certain amount of money and that at that 
time, the terms of the settlement stipulation were performed, no 
Judgment amount would be obtained. 
4. That to your Affiant's best]? knowledge and belief, the 
Defendant at the time paid all of the money that was owed 
pursuant to the settlement and removfed itself from the premises 
in a timely fashion. 
5. That in August of 1980, the Defendant received notice 
that a Judgment had been taken against it for and including 
treble damages, in violation of the settlement agreement. That 
no notice prior to this time, had been sent to the Defendant or 
your Affiant, claiming there was any deficiency under the 
agreement. 
6. That two Motions To Set Aside were fl led in this Court 
in a timely manner at that time following the entry of the 
Judgment. 
7. That the matters were stricken from the calendar on the 
basis that your Affiant believed after speaking with counsel, at 
that time, for the Plaintiff, that the matter had been resolved 
and the Judgment would be removed as it was in error. 
8. Following these discussions no further action was taken 
by the Plaintiff for a period of five years, until March of 1985, 
when Plaintiff transferred its account to Mark A. Larsen, an 
attorney representing the President of the Defendant company's 
ex-wife for collection. 
9. That this c o l l e c t i o n effort against property 
precipitated the filing of Plaintiff's bankruptcy in April of 
1985. Subsequent to that time, the President of the Defendant 
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company has attempted to talk with the owner of the Plaintiff ill 
an attempt to resolve the matter, but all negotiations have nofy > 
failed. 
10. That Plaintiff has now filed a Plan in the bankruptcy 
action and as part of that Plan, has compelled to attempt to set 
aside this judgment and therefore, has filed a Motion i^n 
conjunction with this Affidavit. 
11. That in the interest of justice, your Affiant believes 
that the amount is inaccurate and should be set aside and should 
not be allowed to remain as a Judgment against this Defendant. 
12. Further YQiir Affiant sav* 
DATED this // ^J^&Sy ot Ma] 
1986. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN t o be f 
NOTSRY" PUBLIC1 
Residing at: Ogden, Utah 
My Comnission Expires; 
MARK A. LARSEN 
DART, ADAMSON & PARKEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
310 South Main St.f Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-6383 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
INTERMOUNTAIN HOLDING COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
ADVANCED BUSINESS EQUIPMENT, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Civil No. C78-6868 
Honorable Scott Daniels 
On December 19, 193 6, defendant's Motion to Set Aside 
Judgment came on for hearing before the above-captioned 
Court, the Honorable Scott Daniels presiding. Plaintiff 
Intermountain Holding Company was represented by Mark A. 
Larsen. Defendant Advanced Business Equipment was 
represented by John T. Caine. After reviewing the file, 
including the Affidavit of Randall S. Feil, listening to the 
oral arguments of counsel, and the Court being fully advised, 
it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that Plaintiff's 
Motion to Set Aside Judgment is denied. 
Dated: December 2Jl_, 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
{Scott Daniels 
D i s t r i c t Court Judge 
